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RULE 10b-5: BIRTH OF THE CONCEPT OF MARKET
INSIDER AND ITS APPLICATION IN A CRIMINAL
CASE-UNITED STATES v. CHIARELLA
I. Introduction
Rule 10b-5 requires a corporate insider to disclose nonpublic mar-
ket information that affects the value of the corporation's securities
or abstain from trading those securities.' Courts have hitherto lim-
ited the scope of a corporate insider to those with a special relation-
ship to the issuing corporation, principally officers and directors. 2 In
United States v. Chiarella,3 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that any person inside the market who regularly receives spe-
cial knowledge of nonpublic market information has a duty to dis-
close that information or abstain from trading in the corporation's
1. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
The rule was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). This section states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on the national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
2. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-57 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The duty to disclose or abstain has also been applied to
other persons. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951)
(controlling shareholders); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 495 F.2d
228, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1974) (broker dealers and underwriters); Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817,
823 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386
(1974) (tippee of a tippee of a corporate insider).
3. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 2158 (May 15, 1979) (No. 78-
1202).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
securities.' The court reasoned that only with such a rule could the
purpose of protecting the public securities markets be achieved.'
The district court's judgment and the court of appeal's affirmance
of a criminal conviction raises an unsettling problem of due process.'
Serious doubt exists whether Chiarella had fair notice that his
conduct constituted criminal liability. This Note will argue that
whereas the concept of market insider expressed in Chiarella is a
proper expansion of the scope of rule 10b-5, the conviction of the
defendant is an unconstitutional retroactive application of a crimi-
nal sanction.
II. United States v. Chiarella; Facts
While employed as a "markup man" at Pandick Press,7 Vincent
Chiarella used information which he obtained during the course of
employment to make several profitable securities transactions. Be-
tween September 1975 and November 1976 Chiarella had access to
confidential documents that outlined plans for five different take-
over bids of different target corporations. Although the names of
the offeror and target corporations were disguised by the use of
secret code names in the documents, Chiarella, an experienced
market trader, managed to break the code.' Chiarella purchased
the stock of the target corporations before the tender offers were
disseminated to the target shareholders and was thereby able to
profit from the subsequent rise in the price of the stock resulting
4. Id. at 1365.
5. Id.
6. See notes 63-95 infra and accompanying text.
7. Mr. Chiarella worked for Pandick Press, an independent firm located in the financial
district of Manhattan which specialized in printing disclosure statements, newspaper an-
nouncements, and offering and transmittal letters for security transactions, mergers and
tender offers. As a "markup man" the defendant was the first person to receive copy when it
arrived at Pandick; he would then select the type fonts and layouts and would then send the
material to be set in type. 588 F.2d at 1363.
8. Chiarella could deduce the identity of the target corporations by considering the num-
ber of letters in the code names, par values of the stock, and price histories. In one instance
the defendant deduced from information in the documents that the names "Arabia Corp."
and "USA Corp." were in fact code names for Emhart Corp.'and USM Corp. respectively.
The identity of the number of letters in the code names with those in the actual names was
necessary because the code names were replaced with the actual names moments before the
material was printed. The use of the code names preserved the secrecy of the corporate
identities and aided printing efficiency. Such secrecy is important in any takeover bid to
avoid speculation and rising prices of the target stock. Id.
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from the tender offer. After fourteen months and seventeen trans-
actions Chiarella had realized a profit of over $30,000.1 In May 1977
an investigation was conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission which resulted in an enforcement proceeding against
Chiarella. 0 In this proceeding Chiarella entered into a consent
decree" whereby he agreed to disgorge his profits to the share-
holders of the target corporations. On January 4, 1978 a federal
grand jury indicted the defendant on seventeen counts of willful
misuse of material 2 nonpublic information in connection with the
security transactions. The indictment alleged that the purchases
and sales of securities by Chiarella violated section 10b of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5. Chiarella was
convicted by a jury on every count. On appeal the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
III. The Development of Market Insider Liability
At common law one had a duty to disclose material information
only where a fiduciary relationship was shown to exist between the
purchaser and seller of the securities at issue. 5 In Strong v. Repide"'
9. Id.
10. SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. 2534 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1977).
11. A consent decree is a device frequently employed by the SEC whereby a party neither
admits nor denies guilt but agrees to a disposition in order to avoid going to trial. A consent
decree may resolve questions of fact and law as between the parties, but the judgment entered
on the consent of the parties "has no greater dignity ... than any judgment entered only as
a compromise of the parties." United States v. International Building Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506
(1953).
12. An essential element under rule 10b-5 is that the information be material. List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811, reh. denied sub nom.
List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 933 (1965). When a reasonable investor would consider the informa-
tion important in determining whether to buy or sell the security then the information is
deemed material. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Chiarella the information was stipulated as being
material. 588 F.2d at 1364 n.5.
13. Chiarella moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a crime, however his
motion was denied. Judge Owen's opinion denying the motion is reported at 450 F. Supp. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). Judge Owen sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of one year for
each of the first thirteen counts. However, the sentence shall be automatically suspended
after one month imprisonment; a five year term of probation is to follow. 588 F.2d at 1364 n.
7.
14. The majority opinion was written by Chief Judge Kaufman and joined by Judge
Smith. The dissenting opinion was written by Judge Meskill.
15. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 430-31 (1909). See also 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1446-48 (2d ed. 1961).
16. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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the Supreme Court held that a fiduciary relationship existed when
a corporate director purchased shares of the corporation without
disclosing his identity and special knowledge to the selling share-
holders. 7 The general common law majority rule, as noted by the
Court, was that "the ordinary relations between directors and share-
holders in a business corporation are not of such a fiduciary nature
as to make it the duty of a director to disclose the general knowledge
which he may possess regarding the value of the shares before trad-
ing."" While the Court found the defendant guilty it expressly
stated that the holding was limited to the "special facts" and cir-
cumstances of the case."9 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's at-
tempt to limit the holding of the case, Strong was used as precedent
in later cases which held that officers and directors of corporations
as fiduciaries have a duty to disclose nonpublic material informa-
tion before purchasing shares of the corporation."
With the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 the
duty to disclose material information was imposed on all corporate
insiders. Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, prohibits various types of fraud including
misrepresentations and omissions in statements describing corpo-
rate activities, mismanagement, manipulation of the market, tip-
ping, and fraud in connection with the exchange of securities.2' In-
cluded in this last category is insider trading on nonpublic informa-
tion without first disclosing the information to the general public.
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,22 the Second Circuit held that
officers and directors of a corporation must disclose material infor-
mation affecting the value of the securities or abstain from trading
17. Id. at 430-31.
18. Id. at 431.
19. Id.
20. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1446-48. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419
(1909); Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds sub nor.
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics, Inc.,
524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 652 (7th Cir. 1963); Speed
v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24
N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907 (1961).
21. 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 §1 (1978).
22. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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the securities." In this decision the court emphasized that the duty
to disclose was not limited to those in a fiduciary relationship with
the issuing corporation." The court stated that "anyone in posses-
sion of material inside information must either disclose it to the
investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to
protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned
while such inside information remains undisclosed. ' 25
This concept adopted the SEC position previously enunciated in
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co. 2 1 In this case the Commission held
that a corporate insider or a tippee of a corporate insider had a duty
to disclose. 27 This duty to disclose did not emanate from the fidu-
ciary duty which corporate insiders owed to shareholders,2 but
rather, from "the existence of a special relationship giving access
. . . to information intended to be available only for a corporate
putpose . . . and the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing .... ",21 In sum, the parameters of
the duty are defined by the unfairness or unevenness in buying
position.
Chiarella argued that the disclose or abstain rule was limited to
those in a fiduciary relationship to the issuer, 30 notwithstanding the
broad language in Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur set forth
above. 3' The court rejected the defendant's contention that General
Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc.31 compelled a different con-
clusion.3 3 The General Time case involved an attempt by Talley
23. Id. at 848.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
27. Id. at 912.
28. The Commission in Cady, Roberts proclaimed that the operation of rule 10b-5 would
not be limited by the common law requirement of a fiduciary relationship. The Commission
stated that the provisions of rule 10b-5 "are broad remedial provisions aimed at reaching
misleading or deceptive activities, whether or not they are precisely and technically sufficient
to sustain a common law action for fraud and deceit." Id. at 910.
29. Id. at 912.
30. 588 F.2d at 1367.
31. See notes 22-29 supra and accompanying text.
32. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
33. 588 F.2d at 1367-68.
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Industries to displace the management of General Time in a share-
holders' election of directors. Plaintiff corporation alleged that the
defendant violated the disclosure provisions of the proxy rules in
their proxy solicitation34 and had violated rule 10b-5 because the
defendants had purchased stock of the plaintiff corporation without
disclosing to the sellers of the stock the plan to take over the
corporation. 5 The Second Circuit held that a company acquiring
less than five percent of the stock of another corporation is not
required to disclose its potential plans for a merger."6 The court
stated, "We know of no rule of law, applicable at the time, that a
purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary
relation to a prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal cir-
cumstances that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort the
sale."37
The defendant in Chiarella argued that he was in the same posi-
tion as the tender offerors from whom he derived his inside informa-
tion,3" and therefore had no dutyto disclose his information before
trading. The Second Circuit rejected this argument and distin-
guished the defendant from the tender offerors.39 As the majority
opinion explained, a tender offeror, unlike the defendant, does not
regularly receive non public information concerning any stock but
its own.4 0 Additionally, the bidder does not receive information but
creates it." This distinction has been criticized as inconsistent with
the court's concern for equalizing access to market information. 2
This criticism, however, is based on the assumption that the ratio
34. 403 F.2d at 162.
35. Id. at 164.
36. Id.
37. Id. The defendant and the dissent in Chiarella placed too much emphasis on the
quoted language from Judge Friendly's opinion in General Time. The cases can be distin-
guished on their facts. See notes 40-43 infra and accompanying text.
38. 588 F.2d at 1366.
39. 588 F.2d at 1368 n.15. One authority notes that the distinction should not be based
on the risk involved in the transaction, but on "the fact that tender offerors are engaged in
activity roughly analogous to that of security analysts; they also investigate corporations on
the basis of publicly available information in order to determine whether a stock is under-
valued and represents a sound investment." Case Comment, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1545
(1979). While such activity should be encouraged, the opposite is true for persons who derive
their information from non-public sources. Id. at 1547.
40. 588 F.2d at 1366.
41. Id.
42. See, Brodsky, Trading on Non-Public Market Information, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1979,
at 2, col. 1.
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decidendi of Chiarella is to equalize market knowledge. The pur-
pose of market insider liability, however, is to equalize access to
market information, not to equalize the amount of information held
by every trader . 3 If the opposite were true all incentives of the
diligent trader would be destroyed since one would have to disclose
all information before trading."
The market insider concept, as set out in the majority opinion of
Chiarella, is an all-inclusive rule: "Anyone-corporate insider or
not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may
not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an
affirmative duty to disclose. And if he cannot disclose he must ab-
stain from buying or selling." 5 Chiarella extends the "disclose or
abstain" rule established by Texas Gulf Sulphur to apply to
"anybody," not only to corporate insiders. Regular receipt of non-
public material market information is now the sole criterion for
imposing criminal or civil liability for one who deals with the advan-
tage of inside information. In effect, the Second Circuit rejected a
strict reading of Texas Gulf Sulphur and Cady, Roberts which sug-
gested, under the facts of those cases, that liability required a
"special relationship" to the issuing corporation."
In Chiarella the issuing corporations were target corporations to
43. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Intial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 816 (1973).
44. For a discussion of the effects of market insider liability on securities trading see Case
Comment, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1538, 1545-49 (1979).
45. 588 F.2d at 1365.
46. In the same year as General Time the Second Circuit decided SEC v. Great Am.
Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969). The court
indicated in three separate opinions that the duty to disclose imposed by judicial interpreta-
tions of rule lOb-5 would extend "beyond the area encompassed by traditional notions of
fiduciary responsibility." Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 43, at 805. The defen-
dants were sellers of mining property which was exchanged for shares of Great American
stock. The alleged nondisclosure arose when the sellers failed to tell the buyer that the price
paid for the property included finder's fees. 407 F.2d at 458-59. In Great American the court
did not reach the conclusion whether or not the seller had a duty to disclose since their silence
alone constituted fraud against the buyer. Id. at 460-61. Judge Friendly's opinion stated that
"to read Rule 10b-5 as placing an affirmative duty of disclosure on persons who in contrast
to 'insiders' or broker-dealers did not occupy a special relationship to a seller or buyer of
securities, would be occupying new ground and would require most careful consideration."
Id. at 460. Judge Kaufman, in a concurring opinion, went further than the majority. He stated
that "those who buy or sell securities may no longer assume that the unmended fences of
common law fraud will remain the outer limits of liability under Rule lOb-5." Id. at 462.
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which the defendant printer had no relation. Judge Kaufman stated
that the fact "that appellant was not an insider of the companies
whose securities he traded is true, but irrelevant. A financial printer
such as Chiarella is as inside the market itself as one could be."47
All "auxiliaries of the securities industry' ' 4 who regularly receive
nonpublic market information would be classified as market in-
siders and would therefore be subject to the "disclose or abstain"
rule of Texas Gulf Sulphur."9
In defining "market insider" the majority states that the concept
bears a strong resemblance to the American Law Institute's defined
category of "quasi-insider."50 Although the concepts are similar in
their effect, quasi-insiders are held liable only in "sufficiently egre-
gious" situations.5 No such limitation is imposed by Chiarella; the
47. 588 F.2d at 1364 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 1365.
49. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
50. Id. at 1365.
51. ALl Fed. Securities Code §§ 1602(a), 1603 (March 1978 Draft). The more general
provision relating specifically to "insiders" is § 1603 which states:
Sec. 1603 [Insiders' duty to disclose when trading.] (a) (General). It is unlawful for
an insider to sell or buy a security of the issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance
with respect to the issuer or the security which is not generally available, unless (1)
the insider reasonably believes that the fact is generally available or (2), if the other
party to the transaction (or his agent) is identified (A) the insider reasonably believes
that the person knows it, or (B) that person in fact knows it from the insider or
otherwise.
(b) ["Insider".] "Insider" means (1).the issuer, (2) a director or officer of, or a person
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, the issuer, (3) a person whose
relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of
special significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally available, or
(4) a person who learns such a fact from a person specified in section 1603(b) (including
a person specified in section 1603(b)(4)) with knowledge that the person from whom
he learns the fact is such a person, unless the Commission or a court finds that it would
be inequitable, on consideration of the circumstances and the purposes of this Code
(including the deterrent effect of liability), to treat the person specified in section 1603
(b)(4) as if he were specified in section 1603 (b)(1), (2), or (3).
(c) [Secondary Insiders. ] Section 1603 applies to an insider specified in section 1603
(b) (3) only to the extent that he knows a fact of special significance by virtue of his
occupying that status.
Id. at 528-29. Section 1602(a) states:
Sec. 1602: [Purchases, sales, proxy solicitations, tender offers, and investment
advice.] (a) [General.] It is unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or
to make a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a security,
an offer to sell or buy a security, or an inducement not to buy or sell a security, (2) a
proxy solicitation or other circularization of security holders in respect of a security of
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test for whether one is a market insider is his position within the
market and whether he regularly receives material nonpublic mar-
ket information.52 The printer in Chiarella would most likely fall
within the standards of both quasi-insider and market insider liabil-
ity since under the facts of the case, as the majority notes, the
printer's conduct could be classified as egregious due to the extent
of his trading.53
The dissent in Chiarella criticizes the judicial extension of prior
law.5 Judge Meskill argues that the court has drifted into the legis-
a registrant, (3) a tender offer or a recommendation to security holders in favor of
opposition to a tender offer, or (4) activity or proposed activity as an investment
advisor.
Id. at 523-24. The ALI recognized that the concept of corporate insider allowed a loophole in
rule 10b-5 for those persons who had regular access to market information, but who did not
have any relationship to the issuing corporation. The term quasi-insider labels such a person.
The comments following § 1603 note that 'Jilt would be convenient to have a new category
of 'quasi-insider' that would cover people like judges' clerks ... , Federal Reserve Bank
employees . , ." and others with access to non-public information but no corresponding duty
to the corporate source of that information. Id. at 538. The commentary continues, "[b jut
all this does not lend itself to definition." Id. The problem is resolved by the "juxtaposition
of § 1603 with the more general § 1602, which is as broad as Rule 10b-5 is today." Id. at 539.
While some quasi-insider cases might fall under § 1603(b) (3), "[but, to the extent that a
sufficiently egregious case of trading while silent cannot be rationalized on an 'insider' analy-
sis, a plaintiff may fall back on § 1602 (a)(1)." Id.
52. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
53. 588 F.2d at 1366.
54. As noted below the dissent also argues that the defendant's conviction should be
reversed on due process grounds. See note 81 infra and accompanying text. A major distinc-
tion between the majority and dissenting opinions in Chiaretia is the difference in the inter-
pretation of Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). There the defen-
dants were held civilly liable due to a special relationship as transfer agents to those who were
selling securities on a differentiated market. The case involved a bank and the Ute Distribut-
ing Corporation (UDC) whereby the former was acting as transfer agent for the latter's stock.
The stock was being sold by Indian owners to non-Indian purchasers. Thus, there were, in
effect, two markets-the seller's market and the buyer's market. By not disclosing certain
material information, the defendants induced the stockholders to sell in ignorance of an
increased demand and higher price for the UDC stock. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that the defendants violated an affirmative duty to disclose information to the
selling stockholders. Id. at 152-54. In Chiarella Judge Kaufman's majority interpretation of
the case finds that the defendant's "position at the center of the two markets gave rise to a
Rule 10b-5 affirmative duty to disclose." 588 F.2d at 1366.
The key factor under this interpretation is the defendant's regular access to market infor-
mation which is derived from the defendant's position between the split markets. Judge
Meskill, however, notes that in Affiliated Ute Citizens it was not the defendant's position
within the market which created the duty to disclose, but their active participation in a
scheme to defraud which breached a fiduciary duty to the sellers. Id. at 1375 (Meskill, J.,
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lative realm by judicially adopting the "quasi-insider" concept of
the ALI proposal.5 The dissent's objection to the majority's expan-
sion of prior case law is based upon a policy against usurping the
legislature's and the SEC's function to promulgate securities laws
and regulations."
The Second Circuit's decision in Chiarella is a logical and neces-
sary extension of the disclose or abstain rule of Cady, Roberts and
Texas Gulf Sulphur.57 By expanding the scope of rule 10b-5 to in-
clude market insiders the court serves the purpose of maintaining
trader confidence" in the securities market and fulfills the goal of
equalizing the access to market information among traders. The
extension of liability to market insiders for violations of rule 10b-5
reflects an effort by the courts to maintain the remedial nature of
the rule'" and to go beyond the limits of common law fraud."' Thus
it appears that the policy underlying Chiarella is that of promoting
equality of access to information within the securities market.2
Market insider liability is valid in that it is fair to conclude that a
person should not be able to profit from a position in which he
regularly receives nonpublic market information yet has no corre-
dissenting). Therefore, "it was not the bank's clearly superior regular access to market
information concerning UDC stock but its actions in undertaking to act for the sellers that
rendered its silence equivalent to a scheme to defraud the selling shareholders." Id.
55. Id. at 1376 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
56. Id. The dissent states:
When a new weak point is identified-such as abuse of regular access to market
information by certain participants in the industry-a direct attack on the problem
through congressional legislation or SEC rulemaking would be a more appropriate
response than the uncomfortable stretching of existing law engaged in by the majority
here to cover the gap.
Id.
57. But see Note, 58 NEB. L. REV. 866 (1979), for the opposite conclusion: "Unfortunately,
the creation of a market insider duty of disclosure appears before like some a priori principle
without any clear indication that it is the next proper step in the evolution of rule 10b-5."
Id. at 890.
58. See Fleischer, Mundeim & Murphy, supra note 43, at 816.
59. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir.
1974).
60. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); United States
v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975).
61. See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corps., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
62. See notes 58-59 supra. See also R. Siciliano, U.S. v. Chiarella-A Step Toward Parity,
N.Y.L.J., Oct, 22, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
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sponding duty or relationship to the ultimate corporate source of the
information.
IV. Retroactive Application of Market Insider Liability in
Chiarella
The most unsettling issue posed in Chiarella, one which has thus
far received little attention, is the application of criminal liability
to the defendant. Criminal liability is imposed for violations of "any
provision" of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and rules
promulgated thereunder as provided by section 32(a) of the Act."3
Chiarella represents the first instance in which a person was prose-
cuted for violating the anti-fraud provisions of rule 10b-5 in a non-
disclosure situation. Notwithstanding the fact that courts have con-
sistently held that civil precedents apply to criminal violations of
the same act, the scope of insider liability has evolved entirely in
the civil context. 4 It is submitted, therefore, that a due process
problem arises from the Second Circuit's retroactive application of
the expansive concept of market insider.
There have been few criminal cases involving violations of section
10b and rule 10b-5.15 Furthermore, to date there have been no re-
ported cases involving criminal liability for nondisclosure under rule
10b-5. In United States v. Persky" false statements and misrepre-
sentations were made by a corporate executive in a scheme to cover
up a loss due to improper investment of corporate funds. 7 The Sec-
ond Circuit held that section 10b and rule 10b-5 were not so vague
and ambiguous as to deny a defendant's right to due process in a
criminal case.6 In the court's opinion Judge Kaufman stated,
63. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 ff (a) (1976). § 32 (a) provides in part:
§ 78 ff. Penalties.
(A) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter, or any rule or
regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of
which is required under the terms of this chapter, . . . shall upon conviction be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years ....
64. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
65. See 3 L. Loss, SECUITIES REGULATION 1449 n.15 (2d ed. 1961); Mathews, Criminal
Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes: The Nature and
Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 901, 908 n.39 (1971).
66. 520 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975).
67. Id. at 284-85.
68. Id. at 288. In Persky, the defendant claimed lack of fair notice because "expansive
civil interpretations of Rule 10b-5 have so stretched the rule that he was not provided fair
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"Perhaps the most interesting' [issue] is the apparent dissonance
between the general rule that criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed in favor of the accused [citations omitted] and the reali-
zation that civil incarnations of the anti-fraud provisions have, as
remedial legislation, been openly and avowedly construed broadly
[citations omitted].""9 This dissonance is evident in Chiarella.
However the issue there is not whether the statute is too vague or
ambiguous, but rather, whether the defendant had fair notice of the
application of the concept of market insider liability.
In United States v. Charnay0 the defendants attempted to deflate
the price of a target corporation's stock in order to make their tender
offer more attractive to a reluctant board of directors.7' The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the criminal conviction for viola-
tion of rule 10b-5 by relying on civil precedents." Because Charnay
involved a case of market manipulation, the disclose or abstain rule
was not applicable; manipulation of the stock market is itself a
prohibited type of fraud under rule 10b-5.73 Unlike the court in
Chiarella, this court did not have to determine whether or not the
defendants were insiders since no such qualification is placed on the
prohibition against market manipulation.
Thus, in Persky and Charnay the court established that civil
precedents will apply in criminal prosecutions for violations of the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities legislation, and that
in such cases rule 10b-5 will be construed broadly.74 Prior to
warning that his conduct was fraudulent ... Id. at 287. The court rejected this contention.
However, Persky can be distinguished from ChiareUa. In the latter case the defendant's claim
of fair notice violation is not based on the stretching of civil precedent, but on the total lack
of civil precedent which proscribed the conduct of market insiders. The earlier "printer cases"
involved SEC enforcement proceedings in which the printers all entered into consent
decrees in order to avoid litigation. Such an administrative proceeding, as Judge Meskill
points out, should not be construed as a civil precedent proscribing the conduct of market
insiders. 588 F.2d at 1377 n.6 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
69. 520 F.2d at 287.
70. 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
71. Id. at 343-44. The scheme to willfully depress the market price of the target stock was
perpetrated to induce Charnay and others to sell their stock in the target corporation with a
secret guarantee of recovering a certain price after the sale.
72. Id. at 348.
73. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
74. The Supreme Court has addressed this issue in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344 (1943) which was a civil action. In Joiner the defendants were accused of fraud
in connection with the sales and assignments of oil and gas leases in violation of sections 5(a)
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Chiarella, however, there was no judicial statement that market
insiders would be held either civilly or criminally liable. This lack
of civil precedent should prevent the retroactive application of mar-
ket insider liability in a criminal case.
Due process requires "a clear and definite statement of the con-
duct proscribed."75 The majority in Chiarella finds that the defen-
dant was given adequate notice under the facts of the case since
signs were posted throughout the printshop stating that criminal
liability could result from the use of any information obtained dur-
ing the course of employment.76 The majority also notes that there
have been several SEC enforcement proceedings against printers
prior to Chiarella's market trading.77 Judge Kaufman explained the
relevance of the signs remarking, "Chiarella's conduct was rendered
illegal by the language and policy of the statute and rule. The sign
merely informed appellant of the SEC's view of the law-a view we
and 17a(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933. The SEC sought an injunction against the
defendants making certain representations; the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit denied the injunction based on the determination that the assignments were not
"securities" or investment contracts under section 2 (1) of the 1933 Act. Id. at 348. Therefore,
the Supreme Court was concerned only with the narrow issue of defining a security. The
defendants argued that a strict interpretation of the Act was required since potential criminal
sanctions were involved 'for violations of the Act. The Supreme Court rejected this argument
and explained that the liberal construction called for by the Securities Act precluded any
argument for narrow construction. Id. at 353-54. As a result the defendants were enjoined
from making further fraudulent representations. Id. at 355.
75. 520 F.2d at 288.
76. 588 F.2d at 1369. The signs throughout Pandick Press stated:
TO ALL EMPLOYEES:
The information contained in all type set and printing done by Pandick Press, Inc.,
is the private and personal property of the customer.
You are forbidden to use any information learned from customer's copy, proofs or
printed jobs for your own or anyone else's benefits, friend or family or talking about it
except to give or receive instructions. Any violation of this rule will result in your being
fired immediately and without warning.
In addition, you are liable to criminal penalties of 5 years in jail and $10,000 fine
for each offense.
If you see or hear of anybody violating this, report it immediately to your supervisor
or to Mr. Green or Mr. Fertig. Failure to report violations will result in your being fired.
Id.
77. See SEC v. Manderano [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,357
(D.N.J. 1978); SEC v. Primar Typographers, Inc. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
REP. (CCH) 95,734 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Ayoub [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Sorg Printing Co. [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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today hold was correct."7 In contrast, the dissent notes that the
posted signs would be relevant to the issue of intent or knowledge,
but "signs posted by a private party can hardly transform conduct
otherwise not covered by a particular statute into conduct prohib-
ited by that statute."79
The issue is thus squarely drawn: Is a nonjudicial statement pro-
hibiting market insiders from trading on nonpublic information
without disclosing that information fair notice to a defendant in a
criminal case? In Chiarella it appears that the defendant's conduct
was cl6arly culpable, but the culpability of the defendant alone
cannot transform his conduct into criminal activity."' The dissent
in Chiarella correctly concludes that due process requires a prior
legislative or judicial pronouncement of the law before it may be
applied in a subsequent criminal proceeding."'
The fair notice requirement was established by the Supreme
Court specifically to apply to judicial interpretations which ex-
panded criminal liability.2 While the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution ' applies to legislative enactments which expand liabil-
ity, 4 the fifth amendment due process clause requires an analogous
prohibition against the retroactive application of expanded liability
created by judicial interpretation." The Supreme Court of the
United States faced the problem of retroacive application of a judi-
cial extension of criminal liability in Marks v. United States." In
this case the Court ruled that the retroactive application of a broad
definition of pornography as stated in Miller v. California" deprived
the defendant of the fair notice requirement of due process."5 in
Marks the defendants were convicted of transporting pornographic
78. 588 F.2d at 1370 n.18.
79. Id. at 1379 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 916-17 (2d Cir. 1978).
81. 588 F.2d at 1377.
82. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1977); Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
84. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
85. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
86. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
87. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
88. 430 U.S. at 196.
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material across state boundaries.89 At the time of defendant's con-
duct the definition of pornography was governed by Memoirs v.
Massachusetts,"° but at the time of their trial and conviction the
definition entailed the broader standard enunciated in Miller v.
California.9' Under Memoirs the standard required the work to be
"utterly without redeeming social value"9 to be pornographic. In
Miller a more broad standard was enunciated; specifically, whether
the work "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."93 Thus, in Marks the Court held that the standard enunci-
ated in Miller expanded criminal liability, and therefore, the retro-
active application of the broader standard to the defendants' con-
duct violated the fair notice requirement of the fifth amendment
due process clause.
The Second Circuit did not address the issue raised in Marks. The
majority in Chiarella concluded that the defendant had fair notice
that his conduct could result in criminal liability. As noted above,
this conclusion appears erroneous in that only judicial or legislative
statements should provide fair notice. Whereas Texas Gulf Sulphur
and Cady, Roberts indicated a broad reading of rule 10b-5, the
financial community has hitherto read those cases as limiting liabil-
ity to corporate insiders. 5 Notwithstanding the validity of the
court's interpretation of rule 10b-5, holding Chiarella criminally
liable is unwarranted.
89. Id. at 191.
90. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
91. 413 U.S. 15 (1973); See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 190-91 (1977).
92. 383 U.S. at 418.
93. 413 U.S. at 24.
94. 430 U.S. at 196. The majority of the Court concluded that the case should be re-
manded for a new trial based on the standards of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966). Justice Brennan with Justice Marshall joining in a partial dissent agreed that the
fair notice requirement of the due process clause was violated, but they felt that no new trial
should be ordered. Justice Stevens concurred in the majority opinion but also objected to
the remand for a new trial.
95. Evidence of the community's concern over market insider liability isishown in the
many articles that have been written. See generally Case Comment, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1538
(1979); Recent Decision, 13 GA. L. REV. 636 (1979); Note, 58 NEB. L. REV. 866 (1979); Brodsky,
Trading on Non-Public Market Information, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1979, at 2, col. 1; Siciliano,
U.S. v. Chiarella - A Step Toward Parity, N.Y.L.J., October 19, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
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V. Conclusion
Chiarella stands as a beacon to all individuals who regularly re-
ceive nonpublic market information that they may not trade in the
securities market without first disclosing their specific knowledge.
Such a rule promotes equality of access to market information, and
therefore tends to equalize the risk among purchasers and sellers in
securities transactions. The rule of disclosure as applied to market
insiders has been implied in prior case law and its application in
Chiarella is a logical extension of these precedents. Affirmance of
the concept of market insider liability would signal to the financial
community that the integrity of the market should be scrupulously
protected.
An affirmance of the defendant's criminal conviction in this case
would be an unconstitutional retroactive application of a criminal
sanction. Notwithstanding evidence which indicates that Chiarella
knew of possible illegality in his conduct, the legal and financial
community apparently considered Chiarella's conduct distinctly
outside the class of insiders to which rule 10b-5 apjlies in nondisclo-
sure cases. Where there exists a reasonable basis for a conclusion
that no fair notice was provided a criminal sanction is unwarranted
and constitutionally questionable.
John J. Murphy
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